Rwanda and Russia have signed a new memorandum to jointly assess and develop Rwanda’s national nuclear infrastructure in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standards. The agreement was finalised during the third Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow.
The document was signed for Rosatom by Deputy General Director for International Activities Nikolai Spassky and for the Rwanda Atomic Energy Board (RAEB) by Rwanda’s Ambassador to Russia Joseph Nzabamwita.
The memorandum provides for concrete steps to identify Rwanda’s current nuclear infrastructure development needs. The work will be carried out in accordance with the approaches and recommendations of the IAEA, as well as Rosatom’s best practices.
The partnership targets three primary areas of development:
- Small modular reactors (SMRS) – collaborating on the planning and integration of SMR power plants;
- A nuclear science hub – creating a dedicated Centre for Nuclear Science & Technology (CNST) equipped with a 10 MW research reactor and advanced laboratories; and
- Personnel training.
“Our cooperation with Rwanda is comprehensive: we are working together on projects for a low-power nuclear power plant and a Nuclear Science & Technology Centre as well as personnel training, said Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev. “Today, 102 students from Rwanda are studying at Russian universities under “Rosatom” quotas. To promote these projects, it is important to develop not only technological and human resources competencies, but also national nuclear infrastructure. The memorandum will allow us, together with our Rwandan partners, to assess existing needs and determine further steps in this area. We see our task as helping Rwanda create a solid basis for the use of peaceful nuclear energy in the interests of energy, science and the country’s economy.”
The infrastructure roadmap is also designed to advance several critical sectors of Rwanda’s economy to align with its Vision 2050 development goals:
- Healthcare: introducing nuclear technologies for advanced medical research and cancer treatment;
- Agriculture – applying isotopic and radiation techniques to preserve agricultural produce, enhance food safety, and reduce post-harvest losses; and
- Mining – leveraging nuclear applications to optimise local mineral processing.
This latest milestone expands upon a long-standing bilateral nuclear framework between the two countries, which began with a memorandum of understanding signed in Moscow in 2018.
In 2019-2020, the framework to establish the CNST was drafted and passed into law by Rwanda’s Chamber of Deputies. A Broadened Atomic Energy Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2023 to deepen technical integration. In May this year, Rwanda finalised a Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Agreement with Rosatom outlining immediate development measures to the end of 2026. In June, at the inaugural Joint Coordination Committee meeting in Moscow, Rwanda and Rosatom sign a critical, targeted SMR Rollout Roadmap.
In June/July 2025, Rwanda had hosted the first Nuclear Energy Innovation Summit for Africa (NEISA) titled The Potential of Small Modular and Micro Reactors in Accelerating Africa’s Energy Transition indicating its shift toward SMRs.
Then, in March this year. the IAEA conducted its Phase 1 Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) mission in Kigali. This evaluated readiness across 19 critical infrastructure criteria, confirming that Rwanda had met the baseline requirements for legal, safety, and regulatory coordination. Passing Phase 1 acted as an official stamp of credibility. It signalled that Rwanda was a “serious” nuclear contender, effectively lowering the political risk for foreign partners.
The US was quick to step in. In May, the second NEISA 2026 in Kigali, Powering Africa’s Future: Turning Nuclear Energy Ambition into Investable Reality, sawa flurry of US activity. Rwanda signed a Nuclear Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (NCMOU) with the US State Department’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification & Compliance.
The NCMOU serves as a foundational diplomatic instrument designed to establish long-term strategic relationships. It outlines US technical assistance to help Rwanda develop a strict regulatory framework, workforce capacity, and civil safety infrastructure. It binds the collaboration to the highest international standards of nuclear security and non-proliferation monitored by the IAEA. While an NCMOU does not authorise the direct export of nuclear material or equipment, it serves as the official framework that enables commercial deals and paves the way for a future, legally binding 123 Agreement.
Simultaneously, RAEB signed a comprehensive Development Agreement with Holtec International. This contract directly commissioned site planning, strict regulatory alignment, and financial structuring to deploy Holtec’s multi-unit SMR-300 pressurised water reactors.
Rwanda is executing a what is often termed “strategic multi-alignment”. This dual-track approach allows Rwanda to extract maximum technical, educational, and financial benefits while ensuring it does not become entirely dependent on a single foreign partner.
Rwanda’s roadmap for deploying its first SMR is a structured, multi-phase plan targeting first operations between 2030 and 2033. The strategy aims to integrate a 110 MWe nuclear facility to supply up to 70% of the national electricity grid. The specific foundational steps mapped out by RAEB are broken down across specific phases.
Under Phase 1, which is already completed, Rwanda requested and completed the IAEA INIR evaluation. RAEB completed initial nationwide site surveys, narrowing the search down to two finalist candidate locations for nuclear facilities. Comprehensive national nuclear laws and safety regulatory frameworks were drafted to align with international standards.
Phase 2 (2026–2028) locks in reactor technology selection and technical specifications. Rwanda’s Nuclear Industrial Localisation Roadmap establishes a funding structure relying on a hybrid mix of sovereign support, multilateral funding, and structured public-private partnerships (PPPs).
Rwanda is executing an aggressive human resource plan to expand its expert base from roughly 50 specialists to over 230 qualified nuclear professionals by 2028. This includes the launch of a four-year Bachelor of Science in Nuclear Science and Technology at the University of Rwanda, alongside university quotas in Russia.
Phase 3 specifies operational targets. Before commercial grid integration, the CNST will go live to handle research and waste profiling. The deployment timeline envisages the completion and commissioning of the first 110 MWe SMR in 2030-2033. If the initial SMR deployment succeeds, Rwanda’s ultimate strategic expansion plan targets a scaling up to approximately 1.5 GWe of total nuclear capacity by 2050.
By allowing Rosatom and Holtec to compete for its future energy grid, Rwanda absorbs Western regulatory credibility and Russian industrial capability simultaneously.
However, the financing strategies offered by Holtec and Rosatom oer fundamentally different paths for funding infrastructure projects. Because Holtec is a private corporation, financing requires a mix of private equity, commercial bank loans, and backing from Western export-credit agencies. This model demands strict financial transparency, rigorous environmental impact studies, and multi-year vetting.
The Rosatom model bypasses the complex commercial banking sector entirely by offering state-to-state credit lines. The Russian government directly subsidises Rosatom’s construction costs via low-interest, long-term sovereign loans. This “build-own-operate” or heavily subsidised loan model requires very little upfront capital allowing construction to begin almost immediately. However, it converts the project into long-term national debt owed directly to Moscow.
As to fuel supply, Rosatom’s strategy relies on a closed-loop fuel cycle. Russia supplies the enriched uranium, manages the reactor operations, and takes the used nuclear fuel back to Russia for reprocessing or storage. This is highly attractive to Rwanda because it completely eliminates the domestic burden of long-term nuclear waste management. The trade-off is operational dependency. Rwanda would rely on Moscow for fuel assemblies for the entire 60-year lifespan of the reactor.
The US-Holtec track utilises a commercial, open-market procurement strategy. Holtec’s SMR-300 reactors use standard low-enriched uranium (LEU). Under the NCMOU, Rwanda is not forced to buy fuel from a single vendor. Instead, it can buy commercial fuel assemblies from various Western suppliers (such as Urenco or Westinghouse). However, this model leaves Rwanda fully responsible for its own long-term waste disposal and exposes it to global market fluctuations in uranium pricing and delays in developing Western fuel supplies.
