History offers many early warnings about the dangers of concentrated supply chains. For centuries, the Roman Empire relied on Egyptian grain; by the time of Augustus, as much as a third of Rome’s food supply came from the Nile. A poor flood season or disruption along Mediterranean shipping routes could threaten the empire’s stability. Control of Egypt’s grain was so central to imperial security that securing the province became a prerequisite for securing Rome.
A similar pattern emerged along the ancient Silk Road. China maintained a near-total monopoly on silk production for centuries, giving it disproportionate influence over the luxury economies of Rome, Persia and Byzantium. These early examples show that when production is concentrated in a single geography, fragility becomes systemic; a pattern that has echoed across civilisations.
Fast forward to today, and the fragilities are strikingly familiar.
The pandemic’s supply chain wake-up call
The Covid-19 pandemic exposed how deeply modern economies depend on tightly optimised, geographically concentrated supply chains. In 2021, when a container ship lodged itself in the Suez Canal, it paralysed nearly 12% of global trade. That same year, semiconductor shortages cost the automotive industry an estimated $210bn. More recently, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since late 2023 forced hundreds of vessels to reroute around Africa, with container traffic through the Suez Canal falling by more than 50%.
These episodes reinforced the reality that highly concentrated supply chains can turn minor disruptions into systemic shocks.
A similar pattern is now emerging in the clean energy transition. The technologies driving decarbonisation – solar panels, wind turbines and batteries – rely on supply chains that are just as concentrated, if not more so, than those that faltered during the pandemic. The stakes, however, are far higher: what is at risk is the foundations of national energy security.
China controls more than 80% of global solar photovoltaic manufacturing capacity, after investing over $130bn into the solar industry in 2023 alone. Wind turbines depend on rare earth elements, and China processes between 85% and 90% of rare earths worldwide – closer to 99% for heavy rare earths. A solar panel installed in Manchester may harness local photons, but its supply chain remains overwhelmingly concentrated in East Asia.
Battery storage intensifies these dependencies further. According to the International Energy Agency’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024, demand for lithium could increase eightfold by 2040 under the Net Zero Emissions scenario, whilst copper requirements could rise by 50%. Lithium demand grew by 30% in 2023 alone.
China processes over 90% of battery-grade graphite. Indonesia and Russia dominate nickel production. The Democratic Republic of Congo accounts for roughly 70% of cobalt mining. The IEA’s analysis reveals that if the largest supplier of each critical mineral were excluded, available supply would fall far below requirements. For graphite, this “N-1” supply would cover only 10% of material requirements.
Market consequences are already visible. Lithium carbonate prices surged more than 800% between 2020 and 2022 before plummeting by 75% in 2023. Such volatility complicates financial modelling for utilities and manufacturers precisely when predictability would facilitate investment.
Europe’s uncomfortable bind
The geopolitical dimensions are perhaps most acute in Europe. Having severed energy ties with Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, the continent finds itself navigating between American LNG imports and Chinese-manufactured renewable technology. European natural gas prices in 2024 remained nearly three times higher than pre-war levels.
This positions European economies in an uncomfortable bind: accelerating renewable deployment means deepening reliance on Chinese supply chains. Slowing deployment to build domestic manufacturing requires extended dependence on costly fossil fuel imports. Neither option delivers energy autonomy. The challenge extends beyond simple procurement. Chinese dominance in clean technology manufacturing is buttressed by state subsidies, vertical integration and scale advantages that make Western competition economically punishing.
Unlike fossil fuel production, the critical mineral supply chain cannot quickly respond to price signals. Developing a new mining operation typically requires 10 to 15 years. This temporal rigidity creates strategic exposure. China has previously restricted rare earth exports during diplomatic disputes with Japan, demonstrating a willingness to weaponise commodity access.
Current policy initiatives, whether the EU Critical Raw Materials Act or the US Inflation Reduction Act, acknowledge these risks. However, the IEA suggests that anticipated mine supply from announced projects meets only 70% of copper and 50% of lithium requirements by 2035.
Progress is being made. Recycling and direct use of scrap metals are set to increase substantially. New battery technologies such as lithium iron phosphate (LFP) and sodium-ion batteries are reducing reliance on cobalt and nickel, though China still controls supply chains for vital components. Major automotive manufacturers are investing in mining operations and forming strategic partnerships. However, these efforts require time to scale.
Nuclear’s distinct advantage
Several governments are reconsidering their energy strategies through this lens. France is expanding its nuclear programme. The United Kingdom has committed to new reactor construction. Canada, South Korea, Japan and the United States are accelerating both conventional nuclear projects and small modular reactors.
Nuclear energy is certainly not without challenges – from regulation and waste management to financing, construction delays and public confidence. France’s EPR reactors at Flamanville encountered massive delays and budget increases, for example. Yet for countries prioritising energy security alongside decarbonisation, nuclear offers a fundamentally different risk profile.
Uranium resources are widely dispersed across politically diverse and stable jurisdictions, including Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan and Namibia. The material intensity is far lower: a reactor requires only a few tonnes of fuel per year, compared with thousands of tonnes of minerals for an equivalent renewable energy output. Reactors maintain 18 to 24 months of fuel inventory on site, enabling strategic stockpiling that is impossible for intermittent renewables. Nuclear thus offers a degree of supply-chain resilience unmatched by other clean-energy technologies.
The path forward
The global economy stands at an inflection point. The choices made this decade will determine whether the clean energy transition enhances or compromises energy security. Recent history suggests that resilience does not emerge spontaneously from market forces but requires deliberate design. The IEA estimates that approximately $590-800bn is required in new capital investments between now and 2040 to meet projected demand growth.
Policymakers should accelerate permitting processes for mining and refining projects in allied nations, invest in recycling infrastructure and circular economy approaches, support research into alternative battery chemistries that reduce dependence on scarce materials, build strategic stockpiles, and foster genuine international collaboration on supply chain diversification.
The private sector has a crucial role to play here through transparency in supply chains, investment in alternative materials research, and long-term contracting arrangements that support new energy supply chain development. Financial institutions can help by developing structures that share risk for capital-intensive projects with extended payback periods.
The irony of dependence on renewables would be profound: that systems intended to deliver energy independence instead created new dependencies, that technologies meant to provide security became sources of vulnerability. The next chapter of the global energy transformation will test whether policymakers and industry can construct resilience alongside decarbonisation, or whether concentration will once again reveal itself as fragility when systems face stress.
