Nuclear energy occupies a paradoxical position in contemporary energy policy. On one hand, it is presented as a cornerstone of energy security, offering stable, low-carbon electricity crucial to climate mitigation. On the other, nuclear projects remain vulnerable to political currents, making deployment unpredictable despite their technical sophistication. The German phase-out following the Fukushima disaster illustrates how policy shifts can reshape not only a country’s, but also a continent’s energy security for decades.
Unlike wind or solar power, which can expand relatively quickly (3–10 years), nuclear projects demand years of planning, immense capital investment, and sustained regulatory approval. Their nature makes them highly sensitive to political environments.
This sensitivity manifests across technology choice, licensing, financing, local acceptance, and public consultation. Decisions in these areas are not purely technical but are entangled with electoral cycles, political agendas, and public opinion. Without stable political support, nuclear projects risk delays, cost overruns, or outright cancellation.
Beyond national politics, European-level frameworks – market design, sustainability classifications, and cross-border electricity integration – shape investor expectations and public debate. Nuclear’s positioning within these frameworks has implications for access to finance, eligibility for state aid, and the perceived legitimacy of long-duration support schemes. In practice, this often translates into a premium on policy durability: investors and utilities scrutinise not just today’s coalition agreements but also the likelihood that support mechanisms will survive into the 2030s and 2040s when projects actually deliver electrons to the grid.
Sweden and the Netherlands provide instructive examples of how politics can accelerate, delay, or derail nuclear initiatives. Sweden’s approach is more market-driven, while the Dutch model is more state-driven, offering two contrasting paths toward nuclear expansion.
The Swedish approach
Sweden’s nuclear history illustrates the weight of political decisions. A 1980 referendum mandated a gradual phase-out of nuclear energy, but in 2010 the government reversed this policy, allowing new reactors to be considered. In 2023, a new plan set targets of at least 2500 MW of nuclear capacity by 2035, aiming for 10,000–12,000 MW by 2045.
Utilities like Vattenfall and Fortum lead project development with relative autonomy in technology choices, relying on their expertise and international industrial support for plant construction. Carl Berglöf, Sweden’s National Nuclear New-Build Coordinator, noted in an interview with NEi that: “Utilities, supported by vendors, have the expertise to manage new reactor projects, in contrast to the government, which lacks such capabilities, though the domestic industry relies on industrial capabilities from other countries to construct the plants.”
Tobias Andersson, Member of the Riksdag, Sweden’s governing body, emphasised that while the government appoints Vattenfall’s board, it avoids direct interference in supplier decisions to prevent delays from public procurement laws. Yet political influence persists through financing mechanisms and government pressure on utilities.
First, the current coalition has put heavy pressure on Vattenfall to invest in new reactors. Vattenfall’s staff is said to be divided, between those in favour of renewables and those who believe the utility should accompany the government’s desire for more nuclear power. The government is keen to see Vattenfall commit to new build in the coming months, ahead of elections, while Vattenfall must ensure profitability and adequate state guarantees.
Second, the state exerts influence through financing mechanisms. Rickard Nordin, a member of the Riksdag from an opposition party, explained that a new government might question the current coalition’s state support. However, recent signals from the Social Democrats supporting new reactors suggest growing cross-party alignment. Still, there is a sentiment that a potential Red-Green government post-2026 might pause nuclear expansion, which could pose risks to investors.
Third, all stakeholders consulted highlighted politics as the main risk for projects, particularly in the event of a change of majority in Sweden’s next parliamentary elections. Patricia Kempf from Industrikraft Sverige, a coalition representing the interests of Swedish industries, noted that political risk remains but expressed hope that given the high stakes, strong guarantees will be offered by the state in the coming months.
Hence, Sweden’s model brings a more market-driven approach, where utilities manage tenders and technology choices, while the state provides financial backing. Yet the model is reliant on long-term political stability.
From a delivery perspective, Sweden’s legacy nuclear fleet and related supply chain provide a partial institutional memory for new build, but long gaps in construction still create challenges. Workforce planning, component qualification, and interface management between owner, EPC, and regulator all become more complex when political signals fluctuate over time. As a result, utilities push for clarity not only on headline targets but also on the practical contours of state support, liability frameworks, and the pacing of permitting.
Local acceptance also matters. While surveys suggest evolving views on nuclear in Sweden, siting decisions and the distribution of benefits – jobs, infrastructure investment, local tax revenues – remain politically salient. Municipalities and regional authorities frequently seek binding commitments on community benefits and decommissioning funds, aligning project milestones with broader industrial development strategies.
The Netherlands and new build
In the Netherlands, nuclear new-build is state-centred. The technology supplier would be selected in cabinet, with responsibility falling directly to ministers and the governing coalition.
In 2022, the government proposed new projects to expand capacity, responding to climate imperatives and energy security concerns. By 2025, however, progress slowed due to coalition instability and competing legislative priorities. Bernard ter Haar, former Director General for Environment and International Affairs at the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and current board member of NL Financial Investments (NLFI) and Hivos, argued that the unstable cabinet may delay critical projects through prolonged studies, feasibility reports, and consultative committees.
Beyond politics, administration also plays a role. As Bertie van der Heijdt from TU Delft explained, the Ministry’s Project Directorate for Nuclear Energy is increasingly focusing on nuclear policy. In parallel, a new state-owned entity, NEO NL, is being established to take responsibility for the realisation of new reactors – covering vendor selection, project management, and licensing. Unlike Sweden, with utilities like Vattenfall and Fortum capable of overseeing nuclear programmes, the Netherlands’ projects are led by an expanding but still limited staff within the Ministry of Climate.
The administration relies on the ANVS, the Dutch Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, which conducts rigorous design reviews and consults with international firms. Joran de Jong, Senior Advisor at ANVS, emphasised: “Our exhaustive licensing process ensures societal safety, granting licenses only when we are fully satisfied with the safety of the proposed nuclear installations.”
Political support for nuclear energy has broadened. According to Silvio Erkens, Member of the Committee for Climate Policy and Green Growth in the House of Representatives, around three-quarters of Parliament support deployment. Even anti-nuclear parties now emphasise cost concerns over environmental ones. Yet if in power, they might still alter the governing coalition’s policy.
Snap elections announced in June 2025 and set to take place as NEi goes to press could affect momentum. Former European Commissioner Franz Timmermans, a candidate for Prime Minister, has a history of anti-nuclear positions. Given the stances in party programmes on nuclear energy, it is unlikely that a large shift in nuclear policy will take place, even with a stronger left in parliament.
For the Dutch case, the interaction between central government ownership of key decisions and relatively lean administrative capacity introduces a timing risk. Cabinet-level choices on vendor, site, and financing model must be synchronised with grid expansion plans, workforce development, and environmental impact assessments. Each of these sub-systems runs on different clocks. Misalignment – common in multi-year megaprojects – can force rework and invite legal challenge, especially in jurisdictions with robust public-participation procedures.
Financing: Risk and burden-sharing
Nuclear projects require billions in upfront investment, often decades before producing electricity. Securing financing usually demands state-backed loans, guarantees, or subsidies, making financing deeply political.
In Sweden, the Ministry of Finance proposes government-backed loans and aid, subject to parliamentary approval. In 2025, proposals sparked extensive debate at regional and national levels. Local authorities questioned the distribution of economic benefits, while environmental groups highlighted risks. Most opposition now focuses on financing rather than the principle of nuclear power, reflecting a shift in the political landscape.
To secure expansion, the government has introduced a three-part financing programme: state loans covering up to 75% of construction costs at low interest rates, Contracts for Difference guaranteeing stable wholesale prices for 40 years, and risk-sharing mechanisms between public and private sectors. Balder Hagert, Portfolio Manager at Kärnfull Next, stated: “I think this structure also aims to ensure a long-term commitment from a political standpoint, and thus reduce one of the key risk and cost-drivers for capital intensive and long-standing infrastructure like nuclear. Meaning, the risk of political interference.”
Negotiations between Vattenfall and the state are ongoing and will be decisive before investment decisions are made. Sources highlight that while the government is keen to move quickly, Vattenfall must ensure profitability for its shareholders.
An important development has been talks between Vattenfall and Industrikraft, which gathers 14 companies including key Swedish industrial players. Industrikraft could take a stake in Videberg and exert influence on future coalitions to ensure projects move forward, though the extent remains uncertain.
Beyond the headline instruments, transaction structure matters. Investors and lenders will parse how strike prices are indexed, how construction cost overruns are shared, what completion guarantees apply, and how outage and performance risks are allocated post-COD. Even with strong state involvement, the balance between merchant exposure and policy-backed revenue stability determines the cost of capital – and ultimately the levelised cost of electricity offered to consumers and industry.
In the Netherlands, since 2023 the government has allocated significant funding, including €320m in the 2024 Climate Fund for nuclear projects such as extending Borssele and building two new reactors. By 2024, plans expanded to €14bn by 2035 to support four reactors, though opposition parties questioned the use of the Climate Fund.
Hans Schoenmakers, Netherlands Country Manager at Last Energy, explained: “The reluctance of most investors in large nuclear to bear the costs and risks alone means the government must explore a state-backed entity to support new nuclear projects, ensuring long-term commitment.”
An unnamed source from the Ministry of Economic Affairs confirmed that cost dominates the debate. Another source from the Ministry of Climate Policy and Green Growth noted that, given the country’s favourable debt-to-GDP ratio, companies aim to minimise risk exposure. Financing models proposed by vendors will be a key selection criterion, and the government seeks viable financial partners to mitigate risks.
This demonstrates how political contestation over funding can directly threaten project viability, even when technical and environmental arguments are clear. In a state-led model, budget prioritisation competes with other policy goals, and the form of support – equity injections, guarantees, revenue stabilisation – becomes a proxy fight over the proper role of the state in capital-intensive infrastructure. Where coalitions are fragile, financing packages tend to be revisited, prolonging uncertainty for supply chains and local stakeholders.
Licensing, acceptance, and capability
Licensing is often framed as a purely technical pathway, but in practice it is also a governance test. Scope, sequencing, and the integration of environmental assessments can shorten or lengthen critical paths by years. Sweden’s and the Netherlands’ approaches both stress safety and transparency, yet they differ in how responsibilities are distributed between utilities, ministries, and the regulator. Where ministries lead (Dutch model), the bottleneck risk shifts toward administrative capacity; where utilities lead (Swedish model), financing credibility and long-term policy guarantees play a larger role.
Public acceptance is equally pivotal. In both countries, industrial demand for firm, low-carbon power – especially from chemicals, metals, and data centres – provides a political counterweight to opposition. Still, local consultations, land-use constraints, and perceptions of fairness (who bears construction disruption and who benefits) can tilt timelines. Community-benefit agreements, local training programmes, and clear decommissioning provisions are increasingly seen as necessary complements to national-level policy signals.
Finally, capability: after multi-decade pauses in new build across Europe, project governance and supply-chain depth are not automatic. Both Sweden and the Netherlands face a need to rebuild specialised skills – from civil nuclear project management and QA/QC to welding, NDE, and digital I&C integration. Political instability compounds this problem by disrupting workforce planning and vendor mobilisation. Conversely, stable cross-party frameworks can anchor supply-chain investment and enable standardisation across fleet projects, reducing cost and risk over time.
Creating political stability
Nuclear new build projects operate on industrial timelines of 10–20 years and once operating have lifespans of 40-80 years, colliding with electoral cycles of four to five years. Coalition politics, shifting budgets, and public opinion create persistent friction.
Sweden and the Netherlands exemplify these structural vulnerabilities. In Sweden, decades of policy reversals, public protests, and regulatory shifts illustrate how political dynamics can override technical considerations. Recent financing mechanisms are designed to insulate new projects from political swings, but risks remain. In the Netherlands, coalition instability and evolving ministerial structures have slowed progress despite broad parliamentary support.
Both models – Sweden’s market-driven approach and the Netherlands’ state-centred planning – remain exposed to political uncertainty. Sweden demonstrates how industry-led development can provide resilience if coupled with strong guarantees, while the Netherlands highlights the fragility of projects when administrative capacity and coalition politics intersect. For Europe’s broader energy security goals, these cases suggest that durable, cross-party policy frameworks, aligned institutional roles, and credible long-term financing arrangements are as decisive as technology choice in shaping outcomes.
