The UK is planning a new generation of nuclear power plants, both traditional, large designs (such as Sizewell C) and new innovative designs (such as small modular reactors or SMRs). It has also decided to take the opportunity to examine whether the country’s regulatory regime remains fit for purpose. The current regime is seen as increasingly complex and bureaucratic, as it has been evolving since the 1950s, and complexity arises from changes that arise sometimes separately in defence and civilian industries, in dialogue with other national and international regimes, and to meet evolving environmental needs alongside radiological requirements.
The Task Force recently published an interim report setting out ‘interrelated and systemic’ problems with proportionate decision-making, where costly and time consuming standards may have no substantive safety or environmental benefits.
The Task Force says that these issues are not unique. But in the nuclear sector the effects are exacerbated by the perception that nuclear technologies present uniquely high risks to the public and the environment.
Managing risk
The report says “effective and proportional management of risk is vital” but in order that it is both proportionate and effective, behaviours and incentives have to change. The report notes that this applies both to regulators and to so-called ‘duty holders’ (ie, organisations in the industry that are subject to regulation).
Drawing on more than 100 meetings and other inputs, the Task Force discussed a wide variety of issues.
There is a lack of strategic consideration around risk reduction, the report finds. Duty-holders and individual nuclear inspectors sometimes take a local view without considering broader strategic considerations, such as cost, programme delays or national imperatives. In the event issues are escalated, they may be modified but without achieving the best outcome. This fosters very conservative outcomes.
The Task Force said it saw “numerous examples” of costly, conservative and risk-averse measures. It said this may stem from a desire to achieve ‘right first time’ success with Safety Cases or other approvals (rather than incur the costs of reapplying). It said this may be exacerbated if duty holders have weak incentives to control costs.
Regulatory guidance is intended to enable a proportionate approach to risk management, but in practice much of it may act prescriptively – driving risks to levels far lower than those associated with everyday risks. Similarly, concepts such as ‘Relevant Good Practice’ can encourage changes that are not essential for risk management but are deemed desirable because they align with a recent practice.
Duty-holders rarely challenge the regulator or its frameworks. The Task Force was told that duty holders fear that a challenge might damage their reputation for safety. Challenge also causes costly delay.
The Task Force said, “The system in practice lacks the necessary tension, where duty-holders pull in one direction and the regulators in the other. If both are incentivised to prioritise continual risk reduction, then risk may reduce far lower than is proportionate. If these higher standards then become guidance in the future, there is a ratchet effect. Nobody is actively making these decisions and accountability for the rising standards is unclear. This is a serious systemic problem.”
Discussing environmental assessments, the Task Force also looked for proportionality, fearing that more and more requirements could be imposed, without improving overall environmental outcomes.
One specific issue was “an inability or aversion to net off environmental losses in one area with environmental gains in another”. At remote locations, nuclear sites may cause damage to habitats during construction but may enhance local habitats over the decades of operation, as well as having zero emissions. Regulators “take a prescriptive approach to protecting what we have now rather than focusing on nature recovery”.
The Taskforce is considering amendments to an Infrastructure Planning Bill that is now being considered by Parliament, but said “more fundamental and meaningful changes may be required to habitat regulations in order to reduce risk aversion which arises from an excessively precautionary approach to identifying adverse impacts and not defining key terms (such as ‘alternative solutions’) in line with national policy”. The Task Force also discussed the problem of inflexible permitting, noting that new environmental protection measures could potentially trigger a reassessment of a nuclear safety issue, which would clearly be a disincentive to making the improvement.
Reducing complexity
With different civil and defence regulatory frameworks the sector has grown more complex, with overlapping regulatory requirements and consultations. This leads to an inconsistent understanding of applicable standards.
The Taskforce believes that the current system is difficult to navigate and duplicative, particularly for new entrants. Excessive complexity or contradictory directives can create challenges for established and new participants. This makes it harder to deliver projects on time and within budget.
It says early approvals needed to establish a nuclear project “are susceptible to overlapping requirements and scope creep”. An example is Regulatory Justification, which requires significant design information. This forces developers to demonstrate safety and environmental benefits at a very early stage, but the Justification does not smooth approvals in later processes.
The Task Force complained of a lack of coherence: “Not only is there inconsistency between different regulators, there appear to be examples of inconsistency between different personnel within the same regulatory body. This differs horizontally, by differing expertise, and vertically, where more senior regulators may take a broader view. This results in poor decisions, or rework, delays, duplication of effort and strategic misalignment, undermining confidence in the regulatory process.”
The Task Force does praise groups that bring together senior representatives from key stakeholders to address complex regulatory challenges and identify solutions, which they say have improved coherence and coordination with regard to regulating site activities. They say: “The rationalisation of requirements and approaches achieved by these groups is needed across the regulatory landscape at a foundational level”.
Planning regime
A general problem for the UK planning system is that it is slow and cumbersome and the ‘major projects’ regime designed to speed approvals has meant long engagement periods before projects enter the consenting process.
It is also not conducive to new nuclear approaches. It is designed for large traditional reactors and may not recognise innovation that improves safety, and it treats each project as a standalone effort, requiring separate regulatory approvals, design documentation, procurement processes and workforce planning. The group says an opportunity was missed in a recent review of nuclear planning guidance. For example, population density criteria prevent suitable sites from coming forward. It produces identical results for all reactor types if local demographics are the same and does not consider differences between different types of reactors or local conditions.
Standardisation is not sufficiently recognised and, the Task Force says, “this constant re-invention of something replicable is inefficient and costly”. Similarly, UK regulators have limited mechanisms by which other countries’ regulatory decisions can be taken into account, and it appears longstanding practices in other countries are rarely considered as ‘relevant good practice’. The Task Force says that there is little international standardisation. It admits that each national regulator has its own approach, interpretation of international standards and legal framework. Nevertheless it believes there are areas where regulatory approaches are similar that could be used to reduce duplication.
In an overarching issue, the Task Force is concerned about the number of expert staff available, especially with the range and depth of experience and expertise that allows for a more proportionate approach. It warns this lack “can lead to overly cautious thinking and unnecessarily conservative decision-making on safety issues”. The industry is also heavily reliant on a small number of highly specialised contracted entities.
The Taskforce highlighted cultural attributes that hamper the smooth delivery of nuclear programmes. These include “a culture of risk aversion,” with little incentive to transform the culture or the leadership and levers to do so. In addition, the indirect costs of delays to nuclear projects, (financial, labour, material costs or non-monetary factors, such as environmental or social impacts) are often not taken into account by regulators in their analysis of what measures are proportionate. Instead, “the responsibility falls on duty holders to demonstrate their value. There is no guarantee that regulators will agree with their assessment, adding uncertainty to the process”.
The next phase
In its next phase the Task Force is seeking feedback on its interim report. It wants to develop a series of recommendations, but in the near term it hopes to develop a “strategic steer” from government to duty holders and regulators “to ensure the effective and efficient delivery of safe nuclear programmes so that the societal, environmental, and defence benefits of nuclear technology are realised at a measured pace, while maintaining independent regulatory decision-making”.
The group says, “We need to shift the workforce away from nugatory bureaucracy, protracted decision-making, and overly complex safety cases, to focus the existing skills on the safe delivery of programme outcomes”.
