The last few years have seen growing interest in the prospects for nuclear shipping. Numerous start-up and established companies have proposed a range of designs for nuclear-propelled ships or vessels carrying small nuclear power plants using an array of different nuclear technologies. Most of these are just studies but some have set extremely ambitious targets for deployment.
Recent studies include a report by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) looking at the impact of a high-temperature, gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) on the design, operation and emissions of a 145,000 cubic metre LNG carrier. Italy’s Saipem and UK-based nuclear start-up newcleo are undertaking a feasibility study on the application of newcleo’s Small Modular Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (SM-LFR) technology to provide electricity and process heat to oil and gas offshore installations. Netherlands-based nuclear energy development and consultancy company ULC-Energy has undertaken a study commissioned by mining company and shipping charterer BHP to investigate the potential use of civil nuclear technologies to power commercial maritime vessels. UK-based Lloyd’s Register (LR), international shipping company Zodiac Maritime, and South Korea’s HD KSOE and Kepco E&C are developing a project for the research and development of nuclear-propelled ship designs, including bulk carriers and container ships.
Among the more ambitious projects is UK-based start-up Core Power’s planned vessel equipped with a molten-salt reactor. Core Power CEO Mikal Bøe has said that the company is expecting to see its first orders for vessels equipped with nuclear reactors before 2030. This includes both floating NPPs (FNPPs) and nuclear-powered ships. “The formation of the first order book starts in 2028-29,” Bøe told Ship & Bunker. “Our aim is to build a $10bn order book by 2030, and the first deliveries would then be in 2030-35 – we’re not quite sure, but I’d say probably in the latter end of that bucket.”
However, first it will be necessary to fully develop comprehensive national and international regulations with respect to nuclear powered shipping. This is acknowledged by key bodies such as ABS, LR, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as the newly-formed Nuclear Energy Maritime Organisation (NEMO) based in London. So far, nuclear shipping is only covered by disconnected and often outdated regulations that focus on particular aspects of the design and operation of nuclear technologies at sea.
Nuclear codes for maritime reactors
One key document currently available for reference is the IMO’s International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the most recent version of which was adopted in 1974 and entered into force in 1980. However, the 1974 Convention has been updated and amended on numerous occasions since and the Convention in force today is often referred to as “SOLAS 1974, as amended”. It lays down regulations for the safe construction, operation and maintenance of passenger and cargo ships. It also specifies the regulations for the equipment to be used on the ship.
The current SOLAS Convention includes articles setting out general obligations, amendment procedures and so on, followed by an Annex divided into 12 Chapters. These relate to general shipping, except Chapter VIII on Nuclear Ships. This establishes basic standards for nuclear-powered ships and refers, in particular, to radiological hazards. It also refers to the detailed and comprehensive Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships, which was adopted by the IMO Assembly in 1981. This Code is intended to provide a technical and regulatory reference for nuclear merchant ships.
The Code is based on established and accepted shipbuilding, marine and nuclear engineering principles, and IMO recognises that review will be necessary as technology progresses. Currently the Code is restricted to conventional types of ships propelled by nuclear propulsion plants with pressurised light water reactors (PWRs).
The 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships sought to provide clear guidelines and ensure adequate compensation for damage caused by nuclear ships. However, it is considered outdated due to the rapid advancement of nuclear technology over the last six decades.
The Safety Consideration in the Use of Ports and Approaches by Nuclear Merchant Ships, which was developed and adopted in 1968 jointly by IMO and IAEA, has never been revised and as a result is no longer valid.
These provisions are by no means comprehensive. SOLAS and the Code concern only ships propelled by PWRs. They do not cover floating NPPs (FNPPs) or other types of reactors. There are also no specific regulations and risk frameworks to enable nuclear-powered commercial vessels or FNPPs to call at commercial ports. Currently the movement of nuclear ships between ports is enabled by the flag state or licence holder’s national regulator. Separate agreements are required between nations to recognise those licences in order to allow port entry.
New rules for new reactors
Efforts are being made to fill the gaps. NEMO, set up in March 2024, is working with IMO and IAEA to establish global standards and regulations. These aim to cover the deployment, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power in the maritime environment and promote commercialisation of nuclear power at sea. NEMO’s inaugural annual member meeting took place in September 2024. It included the first meetings of working groups focused on maritime regulations and nuclear safety standards. A third working group will concentrate on maritime nuclear liability and insurance. NEMO’s membership currently number 25 companies including ABS and LR.
The Maritime Nuclear Application Group (MNAG) is a research hub and resource centre that brings together experts from the maritime and nuclear energy sectors to demonstrate advanced nuclear technologies for a range of marine applications. MNAG aims to support demonstrations of advanced reactor technologies in marine settings by aligning with the US Department of Energy’s National Reactor Innovation Center. According to its website a review of The Regulatory and Licensing Landscape is “forthcoming”.
In October 2024, ABS published Requirements for Nuclear Power Systems for Marine and Offshore Applications, providing classification notation for nuclear power service assets such as FNPPs or nuclear-powered floating production, offloading and storage units. It does not cover nuclear-propelled shipping though. The requirements allow designers to consider any type of reactor technology and propose a framework for nuclear regulators to collaborate with flag administrations and ABS for complete regulatory oversight and licence.
The guidelines seek to ensure the safe integration of nuclear power systems into marine and offshore applications. Early engagement with nuclear regulators and port authorities is seen as crucial for clarifying responsibilities regarding design approvals. The document references SOLAS, the Code and other IMO requirements for the safe carriage of nuclear materials and other dangerous goods as well as a raft of ABS’s existing rules on shipping and IAEA documents on nuclear safety.
Also underway is a joint study by Danish shipping group AP Moller – Maersk, LR and Core Power for a regulatory assessment of possible nuclear-powered container shipping in Europe. This will look at the regulatory feasibility and frameworks that would needed for a nuclear container ship using a fourth-generation reactor to undertake cargo operations at a port in Europe. It will investigate the requirements for updated safety rules along with the improved operational and regulatory understanding that is needed for the application of nuclear power in container.
A recent LR report, Fuel for Thought: Nuclear notes that the rise of small modular reactors (SMRs) points to a step change for nuclear applications in shipping “if regulatory hurdles can be overcome”. It says nuclear power could transform the maritime industry, but regulation and safety considerations must be addressed for its widespread commercial adoption.
“Nuclear power generation has a strong track record in safety and an engaged set of regulatory bodies overseeing the safe development of new reactor technologies,” it notes. “The introduction of nuclear powered vessels to the maritime industry at any scale will require widespread updates to regulations, including SOLAS Chapter VIII. Cooperation between the IMO and IAEA will be necessary to create a harmonised regulatory system for nuclear powered ships.”
In August 2024, the IAEA gave details of a new project, Atomic Technology Licensed for Applications at Sea (ATLAS), slated for launch in 2025. ATLAS aims to establish a robust framework for the safe and secure deployment of peaceful civil nuclear applications at sea, drawing upon well-established IAEA standards and guidance for nuclear safety, security, and safeguards.
Creating a harmonised regulatory system
A meeting of nuclear regulators at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna in September 2024, dedicated to FNPPs, heard that a harmonised regulatory system for nuclear powered ships, including FNPPs, was already available for reference. Dr Alexey Ferapontov, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Federal Environmental, Industrial & Nuclear Supervision Service (Rostekhnadzor) explained that Russia had already developed a comprehensive integrated body of regulations covering nuclear shipping based on experience dating back to 1959. This includes a total operating experience of more than 400 reactor years.
He noted that currently Russia has in operation seven icebreakers, one lash carrier and the world’s only FNPP, the Akademic Lomonosov. Three of the seven icebreakers are equipped with the latest reactor installation (RI). Two more icebreakers powered by RITM-200 RIs are under construction as well as the world’s most powerful icebreaker, Rossiya with a larger RITM-400 RI.
While the Akademic Lomonosov is powered by two smaller KLT-40 RIs, four modernised FNPPs, equipped with RITM-200S RIs are being developed to provide power to Russia’s far north regions, two of which are already under construction. Dr Ferapontov noted that Russia has also a unique class of specialised ships and floating facilities to service nuclear shipping and to support decommissioning and disposal. The floating technical base (FTB) Imandra, which was launched in 1981 has been modernised and is still operating. However, it is expected to be replaced by 2029 with a new multifunctional nuclear service vessel, already under construction.
To support decommissioning of nuclear ships, Russia also has special radioactive waste facilities, such as Saida Bay, for storing the remains of icebreakers and FTBs. Their parts are collected together and put into special containers. “For the process of decommissioning we also have special rules and regulations,” Dr Ferapontov said. The Rostekhnadzor website provides details on these rules.
He acknowledged that initially Russia did not know whether to license the Academic Lomonosov as a land-based NPP or as a nuclear vessel. “After a several brainstorming and roundtable discussions we made a decision, that it should be considered as a special nuclear vessel,” he said. Over the following years a regulatory framework was drawn up. This involved two main actors Rostekhnadzor and Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (RMRS).
The most important document was Federal Law №170 On the Use of Atomic Energy. In addition, Rostekhnadzor was responsible for a huge number of Federal Rules and Regulations related to shipping. Dr Ferapontov again provided a link to a website containing an exhaustive list. He noted that the RMRS has also developed documentation related to nuclear shipping, including, Rules for the Classification and Construction of Nuclear Ships and Floating Facilities, for which a link was also provided.
He stressed that the work to develop a regulatory framework is a complex task, “which should include an analysis of existing standards, technical features, and also implies the cooperation of several separate bodies, both in the field of marine and nuclear regulation”.
Russia, like most countries, has ratified key international documents such as The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, SOLAS, and the Code. “So, I can highlight, that internationally recognised documents are part of the Russian legislative framework,” said Dr Ferapontov. “Internal documents, such as federal rules and regulations, rules for classification, are based on them.”
However, he stressed that there were several challenges related to these international documents in particular SOLAS Chapter VIII and the Code while acknowledging that application of these document shows a country’s responsibility and willingness to cooperate. For example the Code cannot currently be applied to FNPPs as it relates only to vessels with nuclear propulsion while some of its other recommendations also contain characteristics and criteria, which are not suitable for FNPPs.
Next steps
Looking ahead, Dr Ferapontov welcomed work that is being carried out both within the IMO and IAEA, noting that the last meeting of IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee discussed both amendments to the Code and SOLAS Chapter VIII. At the same time, an Intersessional Working Group on Development of Technical Provisions for Safety of Ships using Alternative Fuels has been set up to look at nuclear fuelled shipping. Rostekhnadzor is participating in these activities.
Moreover, within the IAEA nuclear shipping is being considered by the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) the Agency’s SMR Platform and the Nuclear Harmonisation & Standardisation Initiative. Ferapontov suggested that a document entitled Design Safety and Security Consideration for Floating Nuclear Power Plants could be developed by the IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Standards Committee.
Turning to the question of ports, Dr Ferapontov noted that to receive FNPPs for deployment and possible power generation, ports needed to satisfy certain meteorological and environmental requirements. They would also need special hydraulic structures, staff training, emergency planning, special technical equipment, radiation control and special security.
“In the Russian Federation we have 18 ports in which vessels and other floating crafts are allowed to enter with nuclear power installations and radiation sources,” he noted. Such ports are recognised by Government Decree. Moreover, the Federal Law: On the Use of Atomic Energy includes a special article related to such ports. While a Ministry of Transport decree specifies Rules entry (exit) to the ports of the Russian Federation of ships and other crafts with nuclear materials and radioactive substances”. Meanwhile a decree of Russia’s Chief State Sanitary Doctor of specifies Rules for providing radiation protection port security of the Russian Federation at entry and parking there include nuclear-powered ships, the specialised vessels and floating nuclear power plants.
He also drew attention to the 1968 Safety Consideration in the Use of Ports and Approaches by Nuclear Merchant Ships. He said this document could be a great example of joint work of the IAEA and IMO. “It could be revived and revised, as potentially, it would be very useful for countries which are planning to have floating power plants or to accept a nuclear vessel into a port,” he added.
However, a lot more work still needs to be done, as current regulations, whether for nuclear-propelled vessels or FNPPs, largely concern PWRs. They will not be directly applicable to the many advanced reactor designs, including fast neutron reactors and molten salt reactors, currently being developed by private companies. Additional requirements will need to be put in place to accommodate these technologies.
Headwinds in sustaining international cooperation
It is clear that Russia’s experience in regulating its own nuclear shipping will be very useful to current efforts to draw up international regulations, and Russia’s participation in the IMO and IAEA will undoubtedly speed up these efforts. Unfortunately, the situation is being complicated by geopolitics. In a December 2023 IMO Assembly meeting, Russia failed to win enough votes for re-election to the IMO Council.
The Council, which is the executive organ responsible for supervising the IMO’s work, has 10 Category A members, while Category B and C have 10 and 20, respectively. The USSR, and later Russia, have been Category A members since the IMO began operating in 1958 as a specialised agency of the United Nations.
Russia’s IMO delegation told the Assembly that it deserved its place on the Council. “A balancing and constructive role is what our country contributes, not just to this body, but to the Organisation as a whole,” the delegation said. In a candidate submission to the IMO in September 2023, Russia had noted: “It is clear that due to the external pressure, the IMO started to move away from its equidistant and impartial role in international affairs, to devote more of its precious time to political issues, lying mostly outside of its carefully drafted mandate.”
However, following the December vote, Russia’s Foreign Ministry told RIA Novosti: “Russia’s non-election to the Council will not affect our country’s involvement in the organisation’s affairs, including the payment of mandatory membership fees to the IMO budget.” Russia’s Embassy in the UK said in a statement: “In accordance with the statutory documents, the Council has an administrative and technical role. The main work on the development of international requirements and recommendations for maritime navigation is carried out in the relevant IMO bodies. Thus, non-re-election to the Council for the next two-year period was a pyrrhic victory… and did not cause any practical damage to our participation in the IMO’s activities.”
Despite political complications, it is clear that both the IMO and IAEA have an opportunity to benefit from Russia’s practical experience in operating and regulating nuclear shipping. This experience will prove invaluable as they work with other interested organisations to develop a coherent body of regulations for shipping incorporating advances in nuclear technology.
