The US National Interest in a lengthy report, President Donald Trump’s Executive Orders on Nuclear Energy Aren’t Ushering in a Renaissance, by Sagatom Saha and Matt Bowen, criticises the four executive orders recently signed by US President Donald Trump. Saha is an adjunct research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. He previously served in the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy John Kerry and at the International Trade Administration in the US Department of Commerce. Bowen is a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and previously served as an associate deputy assistant secretary in the Office of Nuclear Energy at the Department of Energy (DOE).

The article notes: “Trump’s executive orders aim for a US nuclear energy renaissance, but without funding, support, and safety measures, the strategy may fall short.”

It adds that the executive orders by themselves do not guarantee the investment or statutory authority, such as the permitting required to meet the goals they contain. The executive orders included a number of very specific goals, including:

  • The Secretary of Defense, through the Secretary of the Army, “shall commence the operation of a nuclear reactor, regulated by the United States Army, at a domestic military base or installation no later than September 30, 2028.”
  • The Secretary of Energy must “release into a readily available fuel bank not less than 20 metric tons of high assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for any project from the private sector” authorised for construction at a Department of Energy (DOE) site for the purpose of powering AI and other infrastructure.
  • The Secretary of State must “aggressively pursue at least 20 new 123 Agreements by the close of the 120th Congress to enable the United States nuclear industry to access new markets in partner countries.
  • A Pilot Programme will be established under DOE control outside the National Laboratories. The Energy Secretary will approve at least three reactors for this programme with the goal of achieving criticality of each by 4 July 2026.
  • DOE must prioritise work to facilitate 5 GWe of power uprates to existing nuclear reactors and have 10 new large reactors with complete designs under construction by 2030.

Saha and Bowen say: “Some elements of the orders – and budgetary actions by the administration elsewhere – risk damaging momentum for US nuclear energy instead of accelerating it.”

It notes that “The independence of the US nuclear regulator – essential to nuclear safety and public confidence – has now been threatened.” The executive order focused specifically on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) “has a number of unworkable, misguided requirements”. It directs NRC “to review all of its regulations and issue final rules within 18 months, while simultaneously proposing budget and staff reductions”.

Another 18-month deadline for final decisions on construction and operating licence applications – regardless of reactor type – “flouts the importance of thoroughly reviewing first-of-a-kind reactor designs”. Advanced reactor designs “can depart significantly from traditional light-water reactor specifications, requiring verified codes, experimental analysis, and careful review”.

Commenting on the executive order directing a reduction in size and review scope for the NRC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), the article noted: “Curtailing its role just as the United States begins reviewing novel reactor designs never before deployed commercially would be ill-conceived and counterproductive.”

The executive orders also suggest allowing commercial projects to bypass a thorough NRC review if the reactor has already been deployed under the oversight of the Energy or Defense Departments. “That move may or may not expedite demonstration projects, but substituting military or DOE licensing for NRC licensing is unwise…. Weakening its role risks setting a precedent where political considerations override independent assessment.”

While acknowledging that designs should be reviewed efficiently, Saha and Bowen say: “Forcing an expedited timeline while slashing personnel and resources at this stage risks compromising safety and ultimately delaying deployment by creating legal vulnerabilities and investor uncertainty – doing more harm than good.”

The article notes: “The notion that deregulation alone will unleash a flood of investment ignores the central constraint of economics. That is, expedited licences themselves do not pay for putting steel in the ground or pouring concrete into foundations. The administration’s narrow view that deregulation leads to growth has led to a misdiagnosis of the challenges facing the industry, leading to an incorrect set of solutions. Building nuclear reactors at a rapid pace requires offsetting risk in a capital-intensive, slow-maturing sector. Absent financing, risk mitigation, and demand-side certainty, no amount of permitting reform is likely to bring a reactor to market.”

The authors also criticise the Trump administration’s plans to walk back tax credits for electricity generated from existing and new reactors. “The House-passed reconciliation bill threatens to unwind much of that framework. It effectively repeals tech-neutral credits for all technologies but nuclear and accelerates the phaseout of the credits to projects or expansions that begin construction by 2028. The problem is that with this accelerated date, it is unclear how many nuclear builds will qualify, though the likely number would be vanishingly small compared to the ambition of the 400 GW goal.”

The House bill also severely constrains the credit subsidies that enable DOE’s Loan Programs Office (LPO) to extend low-interest loans to reactor projects. “If the Trump administration and Congress jettison tax credits that reduce 30 percent of the cost of a new plant (or more) and effectively shutter the LPO, any reforms at the NRC will be vastly outweighed by these economic hits—to say nothing of the damage wrought by undermining nuclear safety and public confidence by undermining the NRC’s independence.”

The article notes that, despite these negative factors the executive orders do contain some constructive components. “The push for a nuclear export strategy is timely, especially in the wake of Russia’s continued dominance in reactor exports. Partnering with allies to build fuel supply chains, deploy reactors, and uphold safeguards is a compelling, bipartisan agenda. Rebuilding the domestic supply chain and workforce is also a prerequisite condition for a nuclear renaissance. However, these priorities will only take hold if paired with a financial toolkit and diplomatic heft, which require expansion rather than rollback.”

Saha and Bowen conclude: “Achieving a genuine nuclear resurgence will be difficult and require thoughtful policy development and sustained bipartisan support. That means empowering the NRC, not undermining its independence. It means building on the progress of the last few years to incentivise new nuclear, not unravelling it. And it means recognising that revitalising an industrial sector as complex as nuclear energy will take more than unfunded directives. On that score, the second Trump administration’s policy on US nuclear energy development appears more harmful than helpful so far.”

The National Interest also published another article critical of the executive orders and two articles defending them.

Advancing a Nuclear Renaissance by Ernest Moniz and John Deutch concludes that US political and corporate leadership should stay focused on the highest priority: scaling nuclear power, which would be helped most by reducing the unit cost of building NPPs and providing financial backstops for the initial stages of new construction. This will happen only when a number of reactors of the same design are built so that learnings can be incorporated. “Politically, this scaling can happen only if the coalition of interests that has materialised recently can be sustained. The president’s executive orders, as written, risk the stability of that coalition.”

Moniz is the Cecil and Ida Green Professor Emeritus at MIT, Co-Chair and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and a former US Secretary of Energy. Deutch is Institute Professor Emeritus at MIT and a former US Undersecretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Director of Central Intelligence.

Trump’s Executive Orders are the First Steps in a Nuclear Revolution by Jack Spencer says opponents of the executive orders who say they could undermine their intended goal are “fearmongering” and that the orders could “easily revolutionise commercial nuclear power”.

Spencer is a Senior Research Fellow for Energy & Environment at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for Energy, Climate, & Environment.

Trump’s Nuclear Revolution Promises Reliable and Affordable Energy, by Tommy Waller and Douglas Ellsworth, says “Trump’s nuclear revolution is not just a policy shift, it’s a call to action.” The choice is “to embrace advanced nuclear power for affordable, abundant energy or succumb to the inertia of bureaucrats and misinformation”.

Lt Col Tommy Waller is President & CEO of the nonprofit Center for Security Policy. He also manages the nationwide bipartisan Secure the Grid Coalition. Ellsworth is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Policy and serves as the Co-Director of the Center-sponsored Secure the Grid (STG) Coalition.