At the invitation of the Government of Syria, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi Syria on 17-18 August and held a meeting with Asaad Hassan Al-Shaibani, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. IAEA said the visit included the site at Deir Ez-Zor and a second location related to the nuclear material recently identified by Syria. This marked “the most significant advance to date in the cooperation between Syria and the Agency, towards resolving the outstanding safeguards issues arising from undeclared activities related to the former regime, under Syria’s Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.
The Minister “reaffirmed the commitment of the Syrian Arab Republic to the NPT and to the full implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement”. He underlined that Syria had “acted on its own initiative in bringing these matters to the attention of the Agency, guided by the conviction that full transparency in this field is integral to Syria’s role as a source of stability and security in its region”.
Grossi “welcomed the proactive cooperation extended by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, demonstrated through transparent and comprehensive engagement with the Agency”. This included Syria’s declaration of 17 July 2026 concerning nuclear material at a location not previously declared, identified recently by Syria, “as well as the provision of information and access in accordance with Syria’s NPT Safeguards Agreement and the practical steps agreed between the two sides”.
At Deir Ez-Zor, the Director General was briefed on the excavation work being carried out by Syria and observed features of the site relevant to the Agency’s assessment of the nuclear related activities formerly conducted there. This work will continue in accordance with the practical steps and timetable agreed between Syria and the Agency.
The Syrian authorities facilitated the initial verification and will continue to do so for the full verification of the nuclear material identified by Syria. IAEA said this “constitutes a key step towards bringing this material under Agency safeguards, as verification activities continue in accordance with mutually agreed practical steps and the NPT Safeguards Agreement”. The Minister affirmed that the Syrian Arab Republic “exercises sovereign responsibility over all nuclear material on its territory, that the material remains in Syrian national custody, and that Syria will continue to perform its responsibilities in accordance with its international obligations and its national interests”.
Syria and the Agency agreed on concrete steps, now being implemented, “to enable the Agency to address the outstanding safeguards issues arising from activities undertaken under the former regime”. Upon the completion of the inspection and of the verification activities as agreed between the two sides, Grossi will report his findings and conclusions to the IAEA Board of Governors at the earliest possible date.
“Syria and the Agency will also expand their cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology in support of Syria’s national development priorities. Both sides regard the steps agreed during the visit as a significant advance towards resolving the outstanding safeguards issues and opening a new phase of broader cooperation.”
Syria signed the NPT in 1968, making it one of the first countries in the Middle East to join the agreement. Following its initial signature, the Syrian government formally ratified the treaty in September 1969, legally binding Syria to its terms as a non-nuclear-weapon state when the treaty officially entered into force in 1970. In 1992, Syria signed its mandatory Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement IAEA to allow routine inspections of its declared civilian facilities.
The Syrian Atomic Energy Commission (SAEC) was established in 1976 and began its institutional activities in 1979. In 2010, AECS established the nuclear science and technology training centre (NSTTC) with the aim of training national and Pan-arab personnel. NSTTC organises a number of events and training activities in cooperation with international and regional organisations.
Syria’s official nuclear infrastructure has historically been small, civil, and open to inspections. Its centrepiece is a Chinese-supplied, 30 kW Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) located near Damascus. This research facility has remained consistently under IAEA safeguards and is used solely for peaceful scientific and medical research.
Outside its official framework, the Syria allegedly operated a highly secretive, military-oriented programme. With clandestine technical assistance from North Korea, Syria secretly constructed a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor at Al-Kibar in the eastern Deir ez-Zor province. The facility was reportedly modelled on North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor and designed to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Just before the Al-Kibar reactor became operational, Israeli fighter jets destroyed the facility in a targeted airstrike in September 2007. The government of former President Bashar al-Assad regime insisted that the site was a conventional military base. However, subsequent environmental sampling by the IAEA uncovered traces of anthropogenic (man-made) uranium, leading the Agency to conclude in 2011 that the site was “very likely” a covert nuclear reactor.
Israeli forces bombed the entrances to site 99 in December 2024, immediately following the collapse and ousting of President Assad Amidst the chaos of Assad’s fall, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) pre-emptively bombed the entrance tunnels and access routes to Site 99. Israel said the strike was a tactical measure to completely block entry and prevent rogue actors or militant groups from gaining unauthorised access to the stored materials.
Following months of intense, behind-the-scenes diplomacy involving the US, Israel, and the interim Syrian government, the regime of President Ahmad al-Sharaa shifted from a stance of denial to cooperation. Faced with explicit warnings from Israel that it would launch fresh military airstrikes if the site was left unsecured, Damascus disclosed the existence of the material to IAEA. Grossi visit to Damascus followed to inspect the material.
The facility contained several tonnes of residual uranium yellowcake and debris salvaged from the Al-Kibar reactor project. While US and Israeli officials noted the material is not enriched enough to build a nuclear weapon, it posed a significant security threat as the possible source of a “dirty bomb” if intercepted. Under the current framework, the IAEA is coordinating to bring the inventory under strict international safeguards.
In a statement released on its Telegram channel the SAEC noted that its cooperation with the IAEA aims to support Syria in peaceful nuclear applications, including healthcare, agriculture, and scientific research. Given the limited technical resources and insufficient international assistance thus far, the Commission renewed its call to establish a specialised international committee to provide technical and legal support, ensuring all measures meet the highest international standards.
