Romanian nuclear utility Nuclearelectrica has rejected all findings of illegality relating to its small modular reactor (SMR) project in Doicești, following a critical report by the Prime Minister’s Control Body (CCPM – Corpului de Control al Prim-Ministrului). In a formal statement to the Bucharest Stock Exchange, management stated that all decisions complied with the law, received full shareholder approval, and resulted in no quantifiable damage to the company.
The CCPM alleged significant irregularities in the Doicești SMR project, including 20-month delays, $3.8bn cost increases, and inflated land acquisition costs. Nuclearelectrica countered that these findings constitute commercial opinions rather than legal infractions, stating the project complied with regulations and that site selection was validated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The Doicești SMR project is a flagship initiative intended to position Romania as the first country in the European Union to deploy next-generation nuclear technology. The project will replace a former 600 MWe coal-fired thermal plant in Doicești with a clean energy complex. It is managed by RoPower Nuclear, a 50/50 joint venture between state-owned Nuclearelectrica and private energy company Nova Power & Gas.
The facility is designed to use NuScale Power’s VOYGR-6 technology, aiming for a total capacity of 462 MWe using six 77 MWe reactor modules. To minimise risk and manage the estimated $6-7bn cost, Romania plans to build and test just one module first before committing to the remaining five. The initial memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Nuclearelectrica and US-based NuScale Power was signed in 2019 to evaluate SMR technology and firm plans for deployment were announced in 2021. The Doicești site was selected in May 2022 and the following September RoPower Nuclear was launched to oversee project engineering and development.
Front-End Engineering & Design (FEED 1 and FEED 2) technical phases were executed in 2023-24 alongside site evaluations backed by the IAEA. In February shareholders approved the Final Investment Decision (FID), transitioning the project from the analytical phase into active implementation. Technical deadlines required finishing the final groundwork in May, including geotechnical surveys, licensing continuation, and Pre-EPC (Engineering, Procurement, and Construction) organisation.
A 15-month Pre-EPC phase is now underway to finalise specific engineering costs, choose heavy-industry contractors, and secure definitive project financing. The targeted commercial operation date for the first 77 MWe pilot reactor module is 2033 with full operational capacity of all six SMR modules to follow in 2034, provided the initial testing unit meets commercial and safety expectations.
The 10-page CCPM report detailed serious irregularities concerning the Doicești SMR project, claiming that certain structural decisions effectively left state-owned Nuclearelectrica “outside the protection of corporate law”. Nuclearelectrica countered each point, filing an extensive 13-page defence to shareholders via the Bucharest Stock Exchange. Nova Power & Gas also rejected the findings of the CCPM report strongly disputing the allegations regarding the Doicești site transaction, calling the report’s conclusions inaccurate.
The CCPM found that the 52-hectare project site was purchased by the joint venture (RoPower) from private partner Nova Power & Gas for €46m ($52m) – almost double the €24m market value calculated by consultancy KPMG. Furthermore, Nova had originally acquired the same land for just €2.8m. The report stated that €22m of the price consisted of “re-invoiced costs” packed onto the transaction solely to mimic a free-market transaction. Because Nuclearelectrica fully funded this purchase through corporate loans to RoPower, state funds had directly covered the markup.
Nuclearelectrica in its response denied any financial harm, maintaining that the €46m valuation was verified by independent expert documentation and covered specialised, pre-existing utility hubs, not raw land. They emphasised that the transaction resulted in zero quantifiable damage to the company or society.
According to CCPM, the Doicești site was selected without a quantitative comparative analysis. The American technical consultant hired to assess locations had ranked Doicești second, yet project leaders advanced it anyway without properly documenting or justifying why the primary recommendation was bypassed.
Nuclearelectrica stated that the site selection was thoroughly validated by robust technical studies and international regulatory standards, including official safety evaluations conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
CCPM criticised the selection of Nova Power & Gas as the private partner, noting it was done without a competitive public procedure or a comparative review of other capable investors. Additionally, the resulting 50/50 joint-venture corporate architecture was flagged as economically irrational. Nova holds 50% control despite contributing only minimal initial capital (€4 m) and the land, while Nuclearelectrica carries the bulk of the ongoing project financing and financial risk through state-backed loans.
Nuclearelectrica responded that the corporate partnership architecture was built strictly inside the boundaries of the law and directly authorised by valid shareholder mandates. They clarified that private partnership choices in commercial joint ventures represent strategic corporate “opportunity assessments” rather than legal infractions.
CCPM alleged that the Front-End Engineering and Design 2 (FEED 2) stage suffered a 20-month delay, pushing its completion from April 2024 to December 2025. The report concluded that management failed to adequately anticipate or mitigate timeline shifts, leaving initial target dates (like starting construction in 2026 and commercial use by 2030) entirely outdated and unfeasible.
Nuclearelectrica countered that timeline changes are completely standard for an unprecedented, First-of-a-Kind (FOAK) nuclear venture. They specified that the implementation schedule consisted of flexible milestone estimations developed alongside technology partners NuScale and Fluor, rather than rigid, legally binding deadlines approved by the General Assembly of Shareholders.
The CCPM demanded several corrective actions for the Doicești SMR project, including setting strict statutory deadlines and strengthening ministerial oversight over capital deployment. Additionally, they required a reassessment of land valuation and a restructuring of the joint venture to protect state assets.
While the report criticised the sole reliance on NuScale, Nuclearelectrica pointed out that its management had actively tried to mitigate these exact risks. Earlier in July, management requested shareholder approval to conduct a technology benchmarking study to evaluate alternative SMR systems. The company noted that this risk-hedging mechanism was directly voted down by the Ministry of Energy (Nuclearelectrica’s 82.5% majority shareholder), forcing the company to legally stick to the initial 2022 NuScale deployment path.
Nuclearelectrica and project company, RoPower Nuclear are continuing efforts to reach a commercial consensus with NuScale Power regarding the terms of module acquisition and the Framework Agreement. However, Nuclearelectrica explicitly reiterated that the project cannot automatically advance to construction. Feasibility, government backing, risk allocation, and a definitive $6-7bn financing structure must still be resolved. If these criteria are not satisfied, the project will be deemed unfeasible.
The financial dispute centres on friction between the executive branch’s economic scepticism and the Ministry of Energy’s geopolitical push to deploy unproven technology. While the Ministry is aggressively driving NuScale project forward, Romania’s political leadership has openly questioned its economic viability.
Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan has publicly criticised the economic justification of the Doicești project. He warned that more than $240m has already been committed to early development despite the fact that NuScale’s technology has never been commercially deployed anywhere in the world. He explicitly cautioned that Romania risks ending up with nothing but expensive land and technical studies rather than an operational nuclear facility.
Political leadership has strongly argued that Nuclearelectrica’s financial bandwidth and capital should instead be directed toward expanding the existing Cernavodă NPP (units 3&4), viewing it as a far more advanced, viable, and predictable asset for the energy grid. Nuclearelectrica countered by stating that Cernavodă and the SMR project do not compete for the same financial pool.
Cernavodă’s refurbishment is heavily reliant on corporate cash, syndicated bank loans, and Export Credit Agencies (ECAs). By contrast, the Doicești SMR project relies on an entirely different, highly volatile financing structure. It depends on securing private external investors, international grants, and specialised ECA-backed loans that have yet to be finalised.
Despite former Energy Minister Bogdan Ivan instructing representatives to vote down the technology review and force the project forward, Nuclearelectrica noted that discussions with the Ministry regarding actual financial support and state guarantees have yielded no concrete results. Because NuScale’s system is a FOAK deployment, it creates a difficult hurdle for lenders. International investors are hesitant to back the project until a definitive Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) framework allocates the financial risks to parties with the capital to absorb them. These include design-performance failure, module delivery delays, and severe cost escalations.
Since the Ministry refuses to let Nuclearelectrica benchmark cheaper or less risky technologies, the project is trapped in a development loop: it has political momentum, but almost no contractual or banking certainty. Critics point to NuScale’s landmark Carbon Free Power Project in Idaho that collapsed after estimated costs exploded from $5.3bn to $9.4bn, raising engineering and financial configuration fears for the Romanian site.
