Digital I&C is safe enough - references

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[8]Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, “Digital Instrumentation and Controls Research Program”, letter issued June 9, 2004.

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[11] Mroczka EJ (NNECO), “Reportable Occurrence RO-82-12/1T”, issued July 16, 1982 (Millstone-1 LER 2451981010R00).

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